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This study provides evidence on both the short-run and long-run investment performance 
of Malaysian initial public offering (IPO) companies that are listed on the MESDAQ 
Market. The factors that influence the performance are also investigated. In line with past 
Malaysian studies, the results of the raw and market-adjusted initial returns show that 
IPO companies are significantly underpriced in the short-run. However, in the long-run, 
both the CAR and the BHAR methods reveal that these companies underperform the 
market. Our results concerning the long-run performance contrast with the results 
observed by previous Malaysian studies using a sample of companies listed on the Main 
Board and/or the Second Board. However, they are consistent with the results reported in 
other countries. We find that companies in the technology sector, issued in a hot issue 
period and underpriced IPO, perform less well in the long-run, which supports the fad 
hypothesis of long-run underperformance. Our results suggest that investors who 
purchase IPO shares on the MESDAQ Market gain high positive returns in the short-run 
but do not fare well in the long-run.  This study provides new information to investors 
when choosing IPOs listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
Keywords: IPO, Malaysia, underpricing, long-run performance, MESDAQ Market 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of initial public offering (IPO) companies' performance has attracted 
great interest from global researchers and academic scholars. The global evidence 
and associated results suggest that IPO companies generate positive short-run 
(initial) returns, usually known as underpricing. For example, Kirkulak (2008) 
reports that Japanese IPOs generate a statistically significant 49.93% return in the 
short-run. The empirical evidence also shows that IPO companies underperform 
the market in the long-run. Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi (2007) reported 
that in the three-year period following IPOs, the cumulative average abnormal 
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return (CAR) and the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for U.K. IPOs are             
–20.76% and –21.98%, respectively, and are significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level. 
 
IPOs are very important in most countries, particularly in developing 
countries such as Malaysia. IPO pricing and performance should be monitored 
via research to determine whether the financial market is efficient. In Malaysia, 
IPO companies must be listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), 
currently known as Bursa Malaysia, to become publicly traded companies. There 
are three boards available – the Main Board, the Second Board, and the 
MESDAQ Market. Companies listed on the Main Board are typically (but not 
always) larger than those listed on the Second Board. The MESDAQ Market is a 




 Considerable research has been conducted on the performance of IPO 
companies, both locally and overseas. Among non-Malaysian published studies, 
Sahi and Lee (2001) examined the short-run performance of property company 
IPOs in the U.K. In China, Li and Naughton (2007) examined board 
characteristics, initial returns and long-run performance of IPO companies. 
Malaysian published studies include, among others, Corhay, Teo and Tourani-
Rad (2002), and Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell and Goodacre (2007), who 
investigated the long-run share price performance of IPO companies listed on the 
Main Board and the Second Board of Bursa Malaysia.  
 
A recently published study by Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) reported that 
there have been limited studies relating to the Malaysian market. Most studies of 
new equities issues in Malaysia examine only the short-run performance. They 
argue that the results concerning the long-run performance of Malaysian IPOs 
from the existing studies are inconclusive. Furthermore, all the prior studies that 
have been conducted in Malaysia used a sample of IPO companies that were 
listed either on the Main Board, the Second Board or both. To date, no research 
has been carried out examining the long-run performance of IPO companies 
listed on the MESDAQ Market. Therefore, there is a need to extend the existing 
research and investigate MESDAQ Market IPOs to add to the existing knowledge 
on the overall performance of the Malaysian IPO market. This paper is also 
motivated by the inconsistent results in previous studies of IPOs in the Malaysian 
market and uses an alternative market as well as more recent data. We have also 
extended our analysis of what factors influence the level of short-run returns by 
including two new variables: technology/non-technology company and hold/cold 
issue period. The inclusion of these two variables in our regression model of 
short-run performance and in our cross-sectional analysis of long-run 
performance provides a strong contribution to the Malaysian IPO literature.  
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Using a sample of 93 MESDAQ Market IPO companies, we find that our 
sample is significantly underpriced in the short run. However, in the long run, 
both the CAR and the BHAR methods that we employed reveal that these 
companies underperform the market. Our results contrast with the results 
observed in earlier Malaysian studies on companies listed on the Main Board 
and/or the Second Board in Malaysia. However, they are consistent with the 
results reported in other countries. We find that companies in the technology 
sector, those issued in a hot issue period, and companies with higher initial 
returns perform less well in the long run. Overall, our results support the fad 





Theoretical Explanation and Prior Evidence on Short-run and Long-run 
Performance 
 
The best-known pattern associated with IPO pricing is the occurrence of large 
positive initial returns that are credited to investors. A number of explanations 
have been advanced for positive short-run returns, including Winner's Curse 
(Rock, 1986), Legal Liability (Tinic, 1988), Dynamic Information Acquisition 
(Benveniste & Spindt, 1989), Signalling (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989), 
Informational Cascades (Welch, 1992), and Ownership and Control (Brennan & 
Franks, 1997).  
 
Another pattern associated with IPOs is that IPOs generally 
underperform in the long-run (Ritter, 2003). A number of theories have been 
propounded to explain these phenomena, including Signalling (Allen & 
Faulhaber, 1989), Divergence of Opinion (Miller, 1977), Fad Hypothesis 
(Aggarwal & Rivoli, 1990); Window of Opportunity (Ritter, 1991) and 
Measurement Problems (Eckbo, Masulis, & Norli, 2000).  
 
There is another pattern associated with IPOs, namely 'hot issue' markets. 
This refers to the time-series behaviour of first-day returns and the number of 
companies coming to market, in which high initial returns tend to be followed by 
rising IPO volumes (Ritter, 1984).  
 
Several studies were undertaken in Malaysia to investigate the short-run 
and the long-run share price performance of IPOs, including Paudyal, Saadouni 
and Briston (1998), Jelic, Saadouni and Briston (2001), Corhay et al. (2002), 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) and How, Jelic, Saadouni and Verhoeven (2007). 
Jelic et al. (2001) and Paudyal et al. (1998) examined the performance of 
Malaysian IPOs using only Main Board sample companies. Jelic et al. (2001) 
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used a sample of 182 IPOs for the period from January 1980 to December 1995, 
while Paudyal et al. (1998) employed 95 IPOs for the period from January 1984 
to September 1995, based on the availability of data. Both studies measured 
initial return by calculating the raw return and the market-adjusted initial return. 
Jelic et al. (2001) measured long-run performance by using both the BHAR and 
the wealth-relative (WR) methods, while Paudyal et al. (1998) employed the 
BHAR method to measure long-run performance. 
 
Jelic et al. (2001) found that there is an extremely high and statistically 
significant positive short-run performance and a statistically significant positive 
long-run return up to three years after listing. However, Paudyal et al. (1998) 
found that on average, Malaysian IPOs are underpriced and privatisation IPOs 
(PIPOs) offer significantly higher short-run returns than other IPOs. In addition, 
regression-based analysis reveals that over-subscription, market volatility, 
proportion of shares sold, underwriter reputation, and ex ante risk explained the 
variation in the excess returns offered by Malaysian PIPOs. However, the 
Paudyal model can only explain 10% and 36% of other IPOs and the whole 
sample, respectively, and neither PIPOs nor other IPOs significantly 
outperformed the market over three years. Their analysis further revealed that the 
IPOs with higher initial returns underperformed the market, while those with low 
initial returns outperformed the market. Jelic et al. (2001) found that there is no 
evidence that IPO offers underwritten by more prestigious underwriters are better 
long-term investments compared to those underwritten by less prestigious 
underwriters. Their results indicate a negative association of upward bias in 
management earnings forecasts with IPO performance during the first twelve 
months after the IPOs. However, Paudyal et al. (1998) found that IPOs 
underwritten by reputable underwriters are significantly better long-term 
investments compared to IPOs underwritten by less reputable underwriters. 
 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) used a sample of 454 Malaysian IPO 
companies listed on the Main Board and the Second Board between 1990 and 
2000, while Corhay et al. (2002) employed 258 samples for the period from 1992 
to 1996. Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) used both an event-time and a calendar-time 
approach to analyse the long-run abnormal performance, while Corhay et al. 
(2002) used an event-time approach to measure performance. Both obtained 
similar results, finding that the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) and 
the buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) significantly outperform the market. However, 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) found that under the calendar-time approach of the 
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, the significant abnormal performance 
disappears. They also found no difference between the long-run performance of 
Main Board and Second Board IPOs. However, they reported that listing year, 
issue proceeds, and initial returns are performance-related. Corhay et al. (2002) 
found that there is a positive relationship between CAR and book-to-market 
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equity (B/M), earnings-to-price (E/P) and cash flows-to-price (C/P); IPO size is 
inversely related to CAR. 
 
How et al. (2007) examined Malaysian share allocation and IPO 
performance by using a sample of 322 Second Board IPO companies from 1989 
to 1992. They measured short-run performance by calculating the raw return and 
the market-adjusted initial return. The CAR and BHAR methods were used to 
determine long-run performance. Their study showed that Bumiputera investors 
and the Malaysian public received almost an equal allocation and made similar 
profits per issue. On average, Malaysian IPOs are underpriced, with a market-
adjusted initial return of 101.57%, and in the long run, irrespective of whether 
equally weighted or value-weighted market adjusted returns are used, sample 
IPOs do not perform poorly. 
 
Studies on IPO performance are not limited to the Malaysian market, but 
have also been performed in other countries such as the U.K. (e.g., Goergen et al., 
2007), Greece (e.g., Tsangarakis, 2004; Kenourgios, 2007), Sri Lanka (e.g., 
Peter, 2007), China (e.g., Li & Naughton, 2007), Japan (e.g., Kirkulak, 2008), 
Spain (e.g., Alvarez & Gonzalez, 2005) and India (e.g., Marisetty & 
Subrahmanyam, 2010). In general, most of the studies find a positive market-
adjusted initial return, ranging from 8.04% in Greece to 134.43% in China. 
However, most of the studies find that IPO companies underperform the market 
in the long-run. 
 
Factors Influencing the Level of Initial Returns 
 
This study has identified several factors that may influence the level of initial 
returns, including sector (technology or non-technology) and issue period (hot or 
cold). Prior studies suggest that the level of underpricing is higher in riskier IPOs. 
Unfortunately, riskier IPOs will be more underpriced than less risky ones. 
Because more than half of the IPOs listed on the MESDAQ Market are 
technology-related companies, we segregated our sample into technology and 
non-technology sectors. We expect that the substantial underpricing can be 
attributed to a large number of technology companies going public. We 
hypothesise that there should be a positive relationship between technology 
sector and initial returns because technology companies are inherently riskier 
investments than non-technology companies; therefore, they must provide 
investors with a higher return to compensate for the increased risk.  
 
The performance of IPOs, both in the short term and long term, can vary 
according to the market conditions in which they are issued (dating back to 
Ibbotson & Jaffe, 1975; Ritter, 1984). Loughran and Ritter (1995) defined years 
with large numbers of IPOs as 'hot issue' periods, and they defined years with 
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small numbers of IPO's as 'cold issue' periods. This IPO activity variable is also 
used by Kooli and Suret (2004), Boubakri, Kooli and L'Her (2005), and 
Jaskiewicsz, Gonzalez, Menendez and Schiereck (2005), among others. Ritter 
(1984) shows that IPOs tend to cluster at certain hot issue periods. Ritter also 
demonstrates that IPOs issued during a hot issue period experience higher initial 
returns. Therefore, we expect that hot issue period IPOs have a positive 
relationship with initial returns. 
 
The age of the company, issue size and company size are used as control 
variables to test the relationship between ex ante uncertainty and short-run 
performance. It is expected that there will be a negative relationship between ex 
ante uncertainty variables and short-run performance (i.e., the younger the 
company or the smaller the issue/company size, the higher the short-run returns).  
 
       Beatty and Ritter (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), and Carter and 
Manaster (1990) suggested a negative relationship between underwriter prestige 
and underpricing. They advocated that prestigious underwriters will reduce 
agency costs experienced by companies related to the IPO. In addition, more 
prestigious underwriters tend to underwrite less risky IPOs to protect their 
reputations. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between underwriter 
prestige and underpricing.  
 
 




This study examines the initial return and long-run share price performance of 
MESDAQ Market IPOs by using data for the period 2002 to 2005. The sample 
period examined is up to 2005 because this study examines 1- to 3-year post-IPO 
performance. It is also due to the need to study long-run post-IPO performance 
for three years after the offer (up to 2008). Given that the study was undertaken 
in early 2009, it was necessary to stop the sample period at 2005. The IPO 
companies' closing price on the first day of listing and the subsequent 36 monthly 
returns were collected from the DataStream database. The IPO companies' issue 
prices were extracted from prospectuses downloaded from the Bursa Malaysia 
website. 
 
Following Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007), the monthly returns for each IPO 
company were then compared with the monthly returns of the market index on a 
rolling basis for each of the 36 months following the initial listing. Companies 
are required to have a complete returns history over the 36-month window. 
According to the FTSE index company website (http://www.ftse.com), the FTSE 
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Bursa Malaysia MESDAQ Index was launched on 10 September 2007. The 
information on base date and historical data is only available from 31 March 
2006. As our performance analysis covers the period from 2002 to 2008, and 
because of the data constraints on the MESDAQ Market Index, the KL 
Composite Index (KLCI) was used as a market benchmark. To provide 
robustness for our analysis and to improve the reliability of our results, we also 
employed an alternative benchmark, the matching company technique, as used by 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007). 
 
There were 104 companies listed on the MESDAQ Market during the 
period from 2002 to 2005. We excluded 11 companies for various reasons: 
missing company prospectus (2 companies), companies that had switched their 
listing board from the MESDAQ Market to the Main Board within three years 
after listing (1 company) and companies that were delisted within 3 years after 
listing on the MESDAQ Market (8 companies). Therefore, our final sample 
consisted of 93 companies, which comprised 89.72% of the whole IPO 




Figure 1. Distribution of IPO companies by year of listing 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of these IPO companies by year of 
listing. There are two bars for each year, labelled 'MESDAQ Market population' 
and 'Sample used'. The figure shows that there is an increasing trend in the 
number of IPOs from 2002 to 2005 for both bars. For the sample used, the 
highest is 43 companies in 2005, which represents 46% of the sample, and the 
lowest is 6 companies in 2002, which represents 6% of the sample. 
The 93 IPO companies are distributed into four sectors – Finance, 
Industrial Products, Technology and Trading/Services. The largest number of 
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companies in the sample were in the Technology sector, which had 58 companies 
(63%), followed by the Industrial Products sector (19%), the Trading/Services 




Measure of short-run performance  
 
We examined the raw and market-adjusted initial returns to measure the short-run 
performance of IPOs. The raw initial return (RAW) on the first day of trading is 











r  (1) 
 
                                                                 
 
where, 
1,ir  is the raw initial return for company i on the first day of trading, 1,iP is 
the first day closing price of company i, and 
0,iP is the issue price of the company 
i. The market-adjusted initial return (MAIR) is calculated by adjusting the raw 
return with the return of the market. It is calculated as follows: 
imii rrMAIR ,1,1,  (2) 
 
                                             
 
where 
1,iMAIR  is the market-adjusted initial return of company i, 1,ir  is the raw 
initial return for the company i, and 
imr , is the return on the market, calculated for 
the period between company i's listing date and its prospectus closing date. 
 
Factors influencing the level of initial returns 
 
This study performs a multivariate analysis to identify factors that may influence 
the short- run performance. A regression analysis is performed to examine the 
level of IPO raw initial return in comparison to variables relating to the IPO 
business sector (technology or non-technology) and issue period (hot or cold),  
along with several additional control variables identified in the literature: 
company age, underwriter reputation, issue size and company size. Our choice of 
potential control variables is based on Malaysian evidence (Jelic et al., 2001; 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2011) and other studies on short-run performance. We 
compute the significance levels as White's t-statistics to correct for 
heteroskedasticity. The ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression model is 
estimated as follows:  





RAWIRi = α0 + β1 TECHD + β2 HOTCOLD + β3 AGE + β4UNDWR + 







RAWIR = initial return (%) measured by comparing the share price 
(pt) at the end of the first day of trading with the offer 
price (p0): (pt-p0)/p0; 
TECHD = dummy variable = 1 for technology sector companies 
and zero otherwise; 
HOTCOLD = dummy variable = 1 for companies that went public in 
the hot period (2004-2005) and zero otherwise; 
AGE = company age in years; 
UNDWR = dummy variable = 1 for prestigious underwriter as 
defined in Jelic et al. (2001) and Ahmad-Zaluki et al. 
(2011) and zero otherwise;  
lnPROCEEDS = natural log of the gross proceeds raised from the IPOs; 
lnMV = natural log of the market value at the time of the IPO 
computed as the number of shares outstanding times the 
closing price on the first trading day; 
εi = error term 
 
For hot and cold issue periods, we employed the definition used by 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), Kooli and Suret (2004), Boubakri et al. (2005), and 
Jaskiewicz et al. (2005). To be more precise, we follow the definition given by 
Jaskiewicz et al., defining hot issue periods as periods that have IPOs above the 
average number of IPOs during the period of study. However, we prefer to use 
median rather than mean because it is not affected by outliers (Jain & Kini, 
2004). Thus, the hot issue periods are redefined in this study as the years that 
have numbers of IPOs above the median number of IPOs for the total period of 
study. The total number of the MESDAQ Market IPO companies over the period 
2002-2005 is 104 companies, with a median value of 26 companies. As a result, 
the hot issue period dummy variable takes a value of '1' if the IPO for the 
company is issued in a year that has a total number of IPOs greater than 26, 
namely 2004 and 2005. The dummy variable takes a value of '0' if the IPO issued 
in the year 2002 or 2003, each of which had fewer than 26 IPOs. Therefore, we 
categorised both 2004 and 2005 as hot issue periods. However, companies listed 
for the years 2002 and 2003 are categorised as cold issue.  
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Measure of long-run share price performance 
 
To measure the long-run share price performance, the cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAR) method and the buy-and-hold return (BHAR) method 
were used. The CAR from event month q to event month s is calculated by 
cumulating the average market-adjusted (matching company-adjusted) returns on 










sqCAR ,  is the cumulative average abnormal return from event time q to 
event time s and .tAR is the average market-adjusted (matching company-
adjusted) return on a portfolio of n stock for the event time t. 
 
Under the buy-and-hold strategy, stock is purchased at the first closing 
market price on the listing date and held for a specified time period. Following 
prior studies (e.g., Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2007), one-, two- and three-year buy-
and-hold abnormal returns are calculated to measure the long-run share price 














where itBHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return of company i  in event month 
t , itr  is the monthly raw return on company i  in event month t , starting from its 
first event listing month and continuing through the end of the three-year 
window, and mtr is the monthly market return or matching company return. A 
positive value for BHAR indicates that the IPO outperformed the market or the 
matching company and a negative value indicates that the IPO underperformed 















Table 1 reports the short-run performance for the 93 IPO companies listed on the 
MESDAQ Market. The mean raw initial return is 37.18%, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. After adjusting the raw initial return with the market 
benchmark (KL Composite Index), the mean initial return fell slightly to 
36.37%.
2
 The raw initial returns range from a low of –66.67% to a high of 
263.64% for the overall sample. The lowest and the highest market-adjusted 
initial returns are –64.96% and 261.86%, respectively. 
 
When we split our IPO sample by sector, we find that IPO companies 
categorised under the Trading/Services, Technology and Industrial Products 
sectors are significantly underpriced, at 64.56%, 34.89% and 27.24%, 
respectively. The finance sector shows a raw initial return of –12.50%, but this is 
not significant. Based on the findings reported in Table 1, we can conclude that 
investors who purchased IPO shares from companies listed on the MESDAQ 
Market for the period 2002 to 2005 gained high, positive short-run returns. The 
results of this study are consistent with the study of Ritter (1998), who finds that 
in general, IPO companies have large positive initial returns. However, the level 
of positive initial return is lower than what was observed in prior Malaysian 
studies. 
 












 Raw MAIR Raw MAIR Raw MAIR Raw MAIR 
Finance  
(n = 2) 
–12.50 –11.69 –12.50 –11.69 –25.00 –18.23 0.00 –5.15 
Industrial 
Products  
(n = 18) 
27.24*** 26.98*** 17.08 15.77 –17.95 –18.16 93.33 90.71 
Technology  
(n = 58) 
34.89*** 33.96*** 13.82 11.63 –66.67 –64.96 246.43 247.43 
Trading/ 
Services  
( n= 15) 
64.56*** 63.36*** 48.33 47.20 –29.73 –28.06 263.64 261.86 
All  
(n = 93) 
37.18*** 36.37*** 16.67 15.34 –66.67 –64.96 263.64 261.86 
 
Note:  This table reports the descriptive statistics of short-run performance by sector. After excluding six 
outliers in our sample, the mean and median short-run performance is 25.37% and 14%, respectively. 
Both of them are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
*** denotes significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level.  
 





We estimated Equation 3 to test our hypotheses in a multivariate framework 
while controlling for additional factors that might influence the level of initial 
returns. Specifically, we performed a regression analysis to examine the 
relationships among the level of IPO raw initial return, business sector 
(technology or non-technology), and issuance period (hot or cold), together with 
several additional control variables identified in the Methods section. 
 
Table 2 shows our bivariate correlation analysis among variables. It 
reports a modest correlation between underwriter reputation (UNDWR) and 
hot/cold issue period IPOs (HOTCOLD), and between company size (lnMV) and 
issue size (lnPROCEEDS), with correlations of –0.3189 and 0.5233, respectively. 
As reported in Table 2, none of our independent variables have high correlations, 




Correlation matrix for variables in the determinants of short-run performance 
 
 IR TECHD HOTCOLD AGE UNDWR lnPROCE
EDS 
TECHD –0.1477      
HOTCOLD –0.0949 –0.0664     
AGE 0.0397 –0.0209 –0.1396    
UNDWR –0.0192 –
0.1793* 
–0.3189*** 0.1153   
lnPROCEEDS 0.0145 –0.1650 –0.1764 0.1688 0.0203  
lnMV 0.2951*** –0.0980 –0.0485 –0.0586 0.0942 0.5233*** 
 
Note: This table shows the bivariate Pearson correlation between dependent and independent variables. IR is 
the level of raw initial returns, TECHD is a dummy equal to 1 for technology sector companies and zero 
otherwise, HOTCOLD is a dummy equal to 1 for companies listed during the hot issue period (2004-
2005) and zero otherwise, UNDWR is a dummy equal to 1 for 'prestigious' underwriters and zero 
otherwise, AGE is the age of companies in years, lnPROCEEDS is the natural log of gross proceeds 
raised from the IPOs, and lnMV is the natural log of the market value computed as the number of shares 
outstanding times the closing price on the first trading day.  
 ***, and * denote significantly different from zero at the 0.01, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using two-
tailed tests. 
 
Table 3 reports the short-run performance regression results using 87 
IPOs after excluding the extreme outliers in the level of raw initial return. The 
extreme outliers had initial return values outside the range of ± 3 times the inter-
quartile range beyond the upper and lower quartiles. The same procedure of 
identifying the extreme outliers is used by Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin 
(2010). To scrutinise the existence of multicollinearity in the estimation of the 
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relationship between dependent and independent variables, the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) for each independent variable are computed and reported in 
column 2 of Table 3.
3
 Consistent with the correlation matrix showed in Table 2, 
VIFs for all our independent variables are below 2.0. These results suggest that 
multicollinearity is not likely to be a major issue driving our results. 
 
During our testing period, 58 out of the 93 companies in our sample were 
in the technology sector. We divide IPOs into two broad categories, technology 
and non-technology. As reported in Table 3, we find that the technology dummy 
variable gives an unexpected sign but is insignificant. This result suggests that 
the short-run performance of technology IPOs is not significantly different to that 
of non-technology IPOs. 
 
 Table 3 
 Regression results for determinants of short-run performance 
 
 VIF Expected sign Coeff t-stat 
Hypothesis variables   
TECHD 1.11 + 12.753 –1.27 
HOTCOLD 1.17 + –23.865 –1.87* 
Control variables   
AGE 1.09 –  1.444 1.25 
UNDWR 1.19 – –12.626 –1.06 
LnPROCEEDS 1.55 – –16.130  –2.53** 
LnMV 1.44 –  29.107   3.53*** 
Constant   175.905  2.07** 
N  87  
Adj R-square  11.25%  
F-stat  3.69***  
 
Note:  This table reports the OLS regression with the level of raw initial returns as the dependent variable. 
TECHD is a dummy equal to 1 for technology sector companies and zero otherwise, HOTCOLD is a 
dummy equal to 1 for companies listed during the hot issue period (2004-2005) and zero otherwise, 
UNDWR is a dummy equal to 1 for ‘prestigious' underwriters and zero otherwise, AGE is the age of 
companies in years, lnPROCEEDS is the natural log of gross proceeds raised from the IPOs, and lnMV 
is the natural log of the market value computed as the number of shares outstanding times the closing 
price on the first trading day. 
***, **, and * denote significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using 
White-corrected two-tailed tests. 
 
As explained in ''Factors influencing the level of initial returns'', we 
categorised both 2004 and 2005 as hot issue periods. Meanwhile, companies 
listed for the years 2002 and 2003 are categorised as cold issue. We find that the 
Nurwati A. Ahmad-Zaluki and Lim Boon Kect 
 
14 
coefficient of the hot/cold issue period dummy is negative but weakly significant 
(at the 10% level). Inconsistent with Ritter (1984), our results suggest that the 
level of initial returns for companies listed during hot periods in Malaysia is 
lower than for those listed during the cold periods. Similar results were also 
observed by Cliff and Denis (2004), in that underpricing is lower when IPO 
volume is high. Further inspection of the data reveals that the percentage of IPO 
companies from the Technology sector is higher in cold issue periods (68%) than 
in hot issue periods (61%). Because Technology companies are inherently riskier 
investments than non-technology companies, they must provide investors with a 
higher return to compensate for the increased risk. Therefore, higher initial return 
is observed in the cold issue periods, which contained a higher percentage of 
technology company IPOs, than in the hot issue periods, although the difference 
is relatively small.   
 
We find that the issue size variable is negatively and significantly related 
to short-run performance, suggesting that small-size issues have high ex ante 
uncertainty that produces a higher return to initial investors. Surprisingly, our 
company size variable has a positive relationship with short-run performance, 
suggesting that the larger the company size, the higher the initial returns. We find 
no evidence that company age and underwriter reputation influence the level of 
short-run performance. 
 
Long-run Performance  
  
Table 4 reports the average and cumulative average abnormal returns for the 36 
months after the listing date for 93 IPOs between 2002 and 2005. Focusing on 
Columns 3 and 4, when the market benchmark is used, the results show that the 
average abnormal return was only significant in the 17th, 18th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 
27th, 28th, 29th and 34th month after the IPO. 
 
It is evident that in the long-run, MESDAQ Market IPO companies tend 
to underperform the market; the CAR for 36 months post-IPO is –41.74%. As 
seen in Figure 2, the CAR becomes negative after the sixteenth month, and the 
CAR starts to decrease steadily from –4.31% in month 17 to –41.74% in month 
36. The negative CAR starts to be significant only at month 24, continuing to 
month 36. The lowest CAR of –41.74% occurs in month 36 and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The underperformance of IPO companies can also be 
observed when the matching company benchmark is used. In 36 months post-
IPO, the CAR is still negative at –17.44%, but insignificant.4 The results of this 
study differ from prior Malaysian studies, such as Jelic et al. (2001), Corhay et al. 
(2002), Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007), and How et al. (2007). They found that 
Malaysian IPO companies outperformed the market in the three-year period by 
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24.83%, 41.71%, 32.63%, and 41.00%, respectively. Following Ahmad-Zaluki et 
al.'s (2007) argument, the difference in results may reflect the different sample 
composition in terms of sample size, influence of MESDAQ Market companies 
in the sample, and the different time period examined.  
 
Table 4 
Average and cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
Month N 



















1 93 2.18 0.54 4.28 1.05  2.18 1.17 4.28*  1.91  
2 93 –0.83 –0.36 –0.15 –0.06 1.35 0.51 4.13  1.30  
3 93 –2.49 –1.46 –3.35 –1.46 –1.14 –0.35 0.78  0.20  
4 93 –2.12 –1.26 –1.71 –0.86 –3.27 –0.88 –0.94 –0.21 
5 93 3.11 1.57 6.60*** 2.69  –0.16 –0.04 5.66  1.13  
6 93 1.63 0.74 1.63 0.66  1.47 0.32 7.29  1.33  
7 93 –0.25 –0.15 1.48 0.67  1.22 0.25 8.77  1.48  
8 93 0.31 0.24 0.42 0.16  1.53 0.29 9.19  1.45  
9 93 –0.17 –0.11 2.71 1.61  1.36 0.24 11.90*  1.77  
10 93 –0.71 –0.61 0.56 0.35  0.65 0.11 12.46* 1.76  
11 93 0.84 0.47 1.44 0.76  1.49 0.24 13.90*  1.87  
12 93 –0.99 –0.65 2.06 1.07  0.50 0.08 15.96**  2.05  
13 93 2.78 0.98 1.81 0.62  3.28 0.49 17.77**  2.20  
14 93 –0.82 –0.41 –0.22 –0.09 2.46 0.35 17.55** 2.09  
15 93 –0.94 –0.58 –0.24 –0.11 1.52 0.21 17.32** 1.99  
16 93 –0.72 –0.36 –2.22 –0.77 0.80 0.11 15.10* 1.68  
17 93 –5.11*** –3.13 –4.96** –2.63 –4.31 –0.56 10.14  1.10  
18 93 –2.33* –1.81 –2.59 –1.34 –6.64 –0.84 7.55  0.79  
19 93 –1.54 –0.76 –1.27 –0.60 –8.18 –1.01 6.27  0.64  
20 93 –2.25 –1.57 –1.71 –0.91 –10.43 –1.25 4.56  0.46  
21 93 –0.08 –0.05 –0.20 –0.09 –10.52 –1.23 4.37  0.42  
22 93 –1.26 –0.69 –1.30 –0.63 –11.77 –1.35 3.07  0.29  
23 93 –2.86* –1.92 –1.78 –1.03 –14.63 –1.64 1.29  0.12  
24 93 –4.00*** –2.69 –0.79 –0.43 –18.63** –2.04 0.50  0.05  
25 93 –3.77*** –2.77 –1.44 –0.75 –22.40** –2.41 –0.94 –0.08 
26 93 –0.73 –0.47 –3.19 –1.60 –23.13** –2.44 –4.13 –0.36 
27 93 –3.08* –1.89 –2.39 –1.06 –26.21*** –2.71 –6.52 –0.56 
28 93 –5.47*** –4.45 –2.13 –1.33 –31.67*** –3.22 –8.65 –0.73 
 
(continued on next page) 
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29 93 –2.89** –2.20 –0.59 –0.36 –34.56*** –3.45 –9.24 –0.77 
30 93 0.71 0.38 1.82 0.84 –33.86*** –3.32 –7.42 –0.60 
31 93 –1.37 –0.91 –1.37 –0.78 –35.23*** –3.40 –8.79 –0.70 
32 93 –1.12 –0.47 –0.47 –0.19 –36.35*** –3.45 –9.27 –0.73 
33 93 –2.19 –1.25 –0.09 –0.05 –38.54*** –3.60 –9.36 –0.73 
34 93 –3.04** –1.99 –5.47*** –2.70 –41.57*** –3.83 –14.83 –1.13 
35 93 0.64 0.34 –0.65 –0.30 –40.93*** –3.72 –15.48 –1.17 
36 93 –0.81 –0.45 –1.96 –0.67 –41.74*** –3.74 –17.44 –1.30 
 





Figure 2. Cumulative average abnormal returns 
 Table 5 reports the long-run share price performance using the buy-and-
hold return method. Column 2 of Table 5 reports the raw buy-and-hold returns for 
our IPO sample, while columns 3 and 5 report the results of the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR), calculated as the difference between the raw returns 
and the market returns and matching company returns, respectively. Interestingly, 
the results show that IPO companies listed on the MESDAQ Market outperform 
the market in the first year of going public, with a BHAR of 12.54%, but this 
value is insignificant. The level of overperformance is greater when the matching 
company benchmark is used, with a BHAR of 31.43%, significant at the 5% 
level. In the second year and the third year, these companies underperform the 
market with a BHAR of –26.83% (significant at the 10% level) and –68.88% 
(significant at the 1% level), respectively.
5
 Even though the level of 
underperformance in the third year is less severe when the matching company 
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benchmark is used, with a BHAR of –25.03%, it is statistically significant at the 
5% level. Our results are consistent with the results of CAR, in which IPO 
companies listed on the MESDAQ Market tend to underperform both the market 
and the size-matched company in the long run. 
 
Table 5 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns  
 




1 23.74 12.54 0.995 31.43** 2.513 
2 21.41 –26.83* –1.913 13.56 0.978 
3 –20.64 –68.88*** –10.141 –25.03** –2.280 
  
Note: *, **, and *** denote significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
 
 Again, our findings are in contrast with the results of prior Malaysian 
studies by Jelic et al. (2001), Corhay et al. (2002), Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007), 
and How et al. (2007). They found that in using the BHAR method to measure 
the long-run performance, the Malaysian IPO companies outperformed the 
market in the three-year period by 21.98%, 39.58%, 17.86% and 28.23%, 
respectively. A possible reason for why the findings of the present study 
regarding long-run performance differ from those of all available past Malaysian 
studies is that those studies were conducted using IPO data listed on the Main 
Board and/or the Second Board. However, the results of the present study are 
consistent with those reported for other countries (e.g., China, Germany, India, 
Japan, Spain, Sri Lanka and the U.K.). Li and Naughton (2007), Bessler and 
Thies (2007), Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2010), Kirkulak (2008), Alvarez 
and Gonzalez (2005), Peter (2007), and Goergen et al. (2007) reported that in the 
three-year period, IPO companies underperformed the market with a BHAR of                                     
–6.50%, –12.70%, –34.49%, –50.10%, –28.24%, –12.96%, and –21.98%, 
respectively. 
 
Cross-sectional patterns of long-run performance 
 
To investigate possible reasons for the long-run underperformance of MESDAQ 
Market IPOs, this section reports cross-sectional patterns of long-run 
performance. We split our sample companies into groups: technology and non-
technology sectors, hot and cold issue period IPOs, and high, medium and low 
initial returns. To facilitate comparison with prior Malaysian studies, we present 
the results of BHAR using the matching companies benchmark. To provide 
robustness for our results, we report the results based on mean and median 
abnormal performance. 
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 Panel A of Table 6 shows the BHARs for technology sector IPOs and 
non-technology sector IPOs. As shown in Panel A, both technology and non-
technology sector IPOs underperform the matching companies benchmark. 
However, the technology sector IPOs show more dramatic underperformance 
than those in the non-technology sector. The mean and median levels of 
underperformance for companies in the technology sector are –34.49% and           
–28.36%, respectively. Both values are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Meanwhile, the mean and median levels of underperformance for the non-
technology sector are only –9.35% and –18.74%, respectively, and are 
insignificant. Our results support the fad hypothesis of Aggarwal and Rivoli 
(1990). This hypothesis suggests a non-rational temporary overvaluation, above 
intrinsic values, which is caused by investor over-optimism that eventually 
evaporates or causes long-run underperformance (Naceur & Ghanem, 2001). The 
severe underperformance in the technology sector, in comparison to the non-
technology sector, may be due to the risky nature of technology sector IPOs. 
 
 Table 6  
 Cross-sectional patterns of buy-and-hold abnormal returns  
 
 Mean Median 
Panel A: Sector   
Technology (n = 58) –34.49** –28.36** 
p-value 0.023 0.028 
Non-technology (n = 35) –9.35 –18.74 
p-value 0.561 0.322 
Panel B: Hot issue period   
Hot period (n = 71) –17.99* –28.41** 
p-value 0.091 0.047 
Cold period (n = 22) –47.72 –5.42 
p-value 0.149 0.314 
Panel C: Initial return (%)    
Low (n = 31) –17.38 –16.51 
p-value 0.324 0.342 
Medium (n = 31) –21.31 1.36 
p-value 0.332 0.563 
High (n = 31) –36.39* –32.87*** 
p-value 0.056 0.004 
All –25.03** –27.40*** 
p-value 0.025 0.018 
       
 Note: *, **, and *** denote significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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 Panel B reports the results of long-run performance by the hot and cold 
issue period IPOs. The mean underperformance of hot issue period IPOs appears 
less severe than that of cold issue period IPOs. However, the result of the median 
is the reverse. Hot issue period IPOs show more underperformance (median =                  
–28.41%, statistically significant at the 5% level) than cold issue period IPOs 
(median = –5.42%, insignificant). The difference in results between the mean and 
the median suggest the effect of outliers in the long-run BHAR. Consequently, 
we rely on the results of BHAR based on the median. Although it is not reported 
in the table, we also performed the same analysis using the market benchmark. 
We find that both the mean and median underperformances are more severe in the 
hot issue period than in the cold issue period. Our results suggest that 
underperformance occurs in years where there are a larger number of IPOs, 
which supports the 'window of opportunity' hypothesis and the findings of 
Loughran and Ritter (1995). However, this study is not in line with the findings 
of Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007).  
 
 The IPO companies in our sample are also segmented by level of initial 
returns: low, medium and high. There is an equal number of IPOs in each 
category (31). As shown in Panel C, there is a tendency for high initial return 
groups to have the worst long-run performance. Both the mean and median 
BHARs show statistically significant underperformance of –36.39% (at the 10% 
level) and –32.37% (at the 1% level), respectively. However, the level of mean 
and median underperformance for the low initial return group is less severe and 
insignificant. Our results suggest that underpriced issues perform less well in the 
long run. This finding is consistent with Kirkulak (2008), who suggests that long-
run underperformance is due to the temporary overvaluation of IPOs by investors 
in early trading. As a whole, our results support the fad hypothesis, which 






This paper examines the short-run and long-run share price performance of 
Malaysian IPO companies listed on the MESDAQ Market from 2002 to 2005. 
Consistent with past Malaysian studies, the results of market-adjusted initial 
returns show that IPO companies are significantly underpriced in the short run. 
However, in the long run, both the CAR and the BHAR methods report that 
Malaysian IPO companies listed on the MESDAQ Market underperform the 
market. Our results contrast with prior studies using Malaysian data finding that 
IPO companies listed on the Main Board and/or the Second Board tend to 
outperform the market in the long-run. The difference in results may be because 
more than half of our sample consisted of technology-based companies. These 
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companies are found to have more severe underperformance than their 
counterparts. In addition, companies that went public during hot issue periods 
and companies with high initial returns perform less well in the long run. Our 
long-run performance analysis supports the fad hypothesis of Aggarwal and 
Rivoli (1990) in explaining underperformance. Overall, our results suggest that 
investors who purchase IPO shares on the MESDAQ Market gain high positive 





1. As of 3 August 2009, the Main Board and the Second Board were merged and renamed 
the MAIN MARKET. Meanwhile, the MESDAQ Market was revamped and renamed the 
ACE MARKET. 
2. We have spent considerable time collecting additional data for companies listed on the 
Main Board and the Second Board to compare the initial returns with companies listed on 
the MESDAQ Market. Using a sample of 145 IPO companies listed on the Main Board 
and the Second Board, we find that the mean raw and market-adjusted initial returns for 
both listing boards are slightly lower (20.36% and 19.37%, respectively) than the initial 
returns given by companies listed on the MESDAQ Market. When we further split these 
samples into the Main Board and the Second Board, we find that both the mean raw and 
market-adjusted initial returns for the Main Board are lower than for the Second Board 
(raw initial returns: Main Board = 15.08% vs. Second Board = 23.88%, market-adjusted 
initial returns: Main Board = 14.50% vs. Second Board = 22.79%). All of these figures 
are significant at the 1% level. Similar results are also observed by Rahim and Yong 
(2010) in their study on initial returns of Malaysian IPOs using data from 1999–2007. 
3. Neter et al. (1985) suggested that a multicollinearity problem can be indicated by having 
the VIF = 10. 
4. One might wonder whether the results using matching company benchmark are more 
reliable than using KLCI as a benchmark. We suggest that the results are less reliable 
when using KLCI as a benchmark because MESDAQ is not comparable to the companies 
included in the KLCI. We used KLCI as a market benchmark due to data limitations, as 
mentioned in our method section. 
5. Additional analysis on data for IPO companies listed on the Main Board and the Second 
Board shows that these companies underperformed the market in the three-year post-IPO 
period with a BHAR of –48.36% (significant at the 1% level). After splitting the data into 
Main Board and Second Board companies, we find that Main Board IPO companies 
perform less well than Second Board IPO companies (–52.89% vs. –45.30%). Both 
values are significant at the 1% level. However, the level of underperformance for both 
Main Board and Second Board companies is lower than what was observed for the 
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